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Are There Too Many Boards of Contract Appeals?
LOUIS J. FRANA*
I. The Problem
Although the first federal government board of contracts appeals was
created in 1861,1 the present proliferation of boards is largely a post-World
War II development, as agency after agency established its own administra-
tive board to hear appeals by contractors from adverse rulings by agency
contracting officers. 2 While a contractor can still seek redress in the Court
of Claims if dissatisfied with the decision of a particular board, trial de novo
in that court has been virtually impossible under judicial interpretation of
the Wunderlich Act.3 The Supreme Court has made this clear in United States
* B.S., St. Cloud State College; M.A., University of Minnesota; L.L.B., University of Vir-
ginia; Chairman, Government Contracts and Procurement Law Committee, Federal Bar
Association; Counsel, Bureau of the Mint, Treasury Department. The opinions expressed
by the author are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Treasury
Department.
Donald W. Farley, second year law student at Catholic University School of Law, was
research assistant for this article.
1. United States v. Adams, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1868).
2. One author has suggested that "they multiply like rabbits." Keeffe, 52 A.B.A.J. 883
(1966). Another points out that "[T]he head of nearly every agency of the federal govern-
ment which engages in contracting to any significant degree has a representative (usually a
board of contract appeals) to hear these appeals .... Caruso, The Federal Boards of Con-
tract Appeals, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 403, 406 (1960). During construction of the new Court of
Claims building, there was talk (more than just a rumor) that the Court of Claims might
have need for a board to hear and determine disputes arising under the contracts.
3. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964). The contracts awarded by all government
agencies incorporate Standard Form 32, June 1964 edition, as amended, General Provisions,
which contain the Disputes Clause required for use by the Federal Procurement Regulations
in government contracts for supplies and nonpersonal services. The disputes clause serves
the purpose of preventing the stoppage of contract performance pending the resolution of
a dispute while providing a relatively inexpensive and rapid method of settling controversies.
The standard Disputes Clause inserted in government contracts covers all disputes involv-
ing a question of fact arising under a contract. It provides that a decision rendered pur-
suant to that clause by the head of the department or agency, or his duly authorized repre-
sentatives, such as a board of contract appeals, shall be final and conclusive unless such
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v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,4 United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc.,5 and
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.6
The importance of adequate administrative machinery at the board level
to facilitate development of the record cannot be overemphasized, since
any later litigation will be based on that record. Furthermore, if the record
is defective or inadequately made, the court will remand the case back to
the board. It is questionable, however, whether a large number of boards,
many of them part-time and ad hoc, can handle this job to the satisfaction
of all parties concerned. Some agencies, furthermore, have no disputes pro-
cedure at all. What is needed is a smaller number of boards, perferably two,
to handle all government contracts disputes. Such a solution is available
within the framework of existing legislation and administrative procedure.
What was done recently by the Treasury Department with its own disputes
procedure illustrates how this solution can be reached.
Prior to April 1, 1967, the Secretary of the Treasury referred appeals
under Treasury contracts (except those of the Comptroller of Currency)
to the Coast Guard Board of Contract Appeals. 7 When the Coast Guard was
transferred to the new Department of Transportation,8 the Secretary had to
determine how to replace the former contract disputes procedure.
To fill the void, Treasury decided: (a) that an established full-time board
of contract appeals in another agency be utilized; (b) that the General Ser-
vices Administration (GSA) Board of Contract Appeals would best serve
the department; (c) that trial counsel in Treasury's Office of General Coun-
sel would represent the department in all contract disputes.9
II. Significance of Treasury Department's Decision
A. Why Use a Full-Time Board?
Recognizing the judicial nature of the administrative proceeding involved
in a dispute, the small volume of Treasury's procurement and the small
number of appeals filed by contractors in disputes with Treasury,1 0 the Secre-
decision is "fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence." These standards of review
appearing in the Disputes Clause have a statutory basis; they are set forth in the Wunderlich
Act.
4. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
5. 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
6. 384 U.S. 594 (1966).
7. 41 C.F.R. § 10-1.100 (1967).
8. 80 Stat. 931 (1966), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (Supp. 1966). The transfer was put into effect
on April 1, 1967. 32 Fed. Reg. 5453 (1967).
9. 41 C.F.R. pt. 10-60 (1967). The above recommendations were based on a memorandum
of law dated February 13, 1967, from the author to the General Counsel, Treasury Depart-
ment.
10. During fiscal year 1967, excluding disputes arising under Coast Guard contracts, only
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tary decided to use an established full-time board in another agency rather
than establish a board of its own to sit ad hoc. Several of the full-time boards
could have fulfilled the Secretary's objectives. At the time of Treasury's
decision, there were eighteen functioning boards of contract appeals, only
six of them full-time.1' All executive agencies have the authority to purchase
and contract, 12 and theoretically, all could establish some type of contract
disputes procedure. But the volume of contracts in most agencies is too small
for there to be any established procedure, 1" so they should arrange for a full-
time board to handle their disputes.
Many lawyers specializing in government contract practice have high
regard for the quality of performance by the full-time boards in recent years.
Members of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals have been com-
mended for developing high standards of fairness and expedition, 14 and have
been said to ".. . stand somewhere between the hearing examiner and the
members of regulatory boards named by the President [in professional
reputation].""
On the other hand, "... the Bar views Boards of part-time Government
two appeals were filed by government contractors in disputes arising under contracts with
the Department. Since there is no correlation between the dollar amount of an agency's
procurement and the number of disputes appealed to a board, there might be a slight in-
crease in the number of contract disputes in the near future.
11. Cuneo, The Administrative Procedure Act Does Not Apply to Boards of Contract
Appeals, 1 A.B.A. PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 18, 22 (1967).
12. 79 Stat. 1303 (1965), 41 U.S.C. § 252 (Supp. I, 1965): "Executive agencies shall make
purchases and contracts for property and services .... "
13 Miller, Administrative Determination and Judicial Review of Contract Appeals, 5 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 111, 117 (1963). This is the most complete listing of agencies that con-
tract, but do not have a formal board procedure. It is noted that there have been changes
since date of publication. See PETROWrTz, OPERATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT
BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS, S. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Petrowitz Report].
Gilbert A. Cuneo, in a speech delivered September 9, 1966, at the Federal Bar Association
Convention, related the following incident:
First of all, I look at the Board situation-what do we have? We have at least 17 Boards
of Contract Appeals with published rules, and this month, or rather August, I was
surprised to learn that in one of our Cabinet Departments we have a situation that is
quite serious. One of our clients filed a notice of appeal on August 8. On August 12, he
received a notice from the Secretary of that Department that the General Counsel of
the Agency would be the Board of Contract Appeals to act as the designated representa-
tive under the disputes article to hear the appeal. On that same day the General Counsel
called the contractor and said--"Your appeal will be heard on August 18. Be present."
No rules, no pleadings, nothing. It is a substantial case and the contractor goes under
if the claim is denied. Now is that proceeding comparable to an Interstate Commerce
Commission proceeding or Federal Trade Commission proceeding? In my opinion any
disputes procedure that makes that possible cannot be compared to a regulatory agency
proceeding.
14. Leventhal, Public Contracts and Administrative Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 35, 39 (1966).
15. Ibid.
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personnel with considerable misgivings."'16 That opinion is supported by the
recent Petrowitz Report,' 7 which points out that members of part-time
boards have regular agency responsibilities as well as board duties. Even
worse, the ad hoc boards lack what little continuity the part-time boards
have, for their members are convened specifically only to hear a given case.' 8
At the time of the Treasury decision, five boards were part-time and seven
were ad hoc. Ten of the eighteen boards included non-lawyers; on seven
boards, the majority of members were non-lawyers.' 9
1. Full-Time Boards Have More Expertise. Treasury thus felt that full-time
boards are in a better position to develop an adequate administrative record
which will support, on review by the Court of Claims or a United States dis-
trict court, a final determination of a board based upon substantial evidence
and meeting standards set by the Wunderlich Act.20 A full-time board is also
more likely to be able to develop the expertise needed to resolve government
contract disputes in an expeditious and proper manner. Any other approach
would probably be more expensive and perhaps increase the risk of com-
piling an inadequate record. The Supreme Court has made it clear that on
appeal by a dissatisfied contractor, the Court of Claims and the district courts
have a reviewing function based on the record made before the administra-
tive agency in settling contract disputes. The Utah2' and Grace22 cases illus-
trate the importance of developing an adequate factual record, since the
courts will be bound by that record in a subsequent claim for breach of con-
tract in those cases where the board could not provide an adequate remedy.
Besides meeting the standards of review provided by statute and Supreme
Court decisions, there is the problem of a board's record being reviewed
by the Comptroller General of the United States. Under the Budget and
Accounting Act of 192123 and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950,24 the Comptroller General, as the agent of Congress, is vested with
authority to examine and audit government financial transactions.25 The
Comptroller General asserts that the General Accounting Office in fact pro-
vides the Government an opportunity for review of an adverse board decision,
an "appeal" otherwise unavailable under express contractual provisions. In
16. vom Baur, A Realistic View of the Bianchi Case, 3 THE FORUM No.5, 5, 12 (1965).
See also Crowell & Anthony, Practical Problems Facing Contractors' Counsel as a Result of
Fragmentation of Remedies, 18 A.B.A. AD. L. REv. 128, 133-34 (1965).
17. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 121, 148.
18. Cuneo, supra note 11, at 22. See also Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 34-35.
19. Cuneo, supra note 11, at 23.
20. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
21. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., supra note 6.
22. United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., supra note 5.
23. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
24. Ch. 946, 64 Stat. 832 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
25. 42 Stat. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964).
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the decision popularly referred to as the "S&cE decision," the Comptroller
General stated:
Since the primary objective of the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 was the creation of an authority outside the Executive, re-
sponsible only to the Congress, to check and prevent administra-
tive action contrary to statutory fiscal limitation imposed by the
Congress, it seems imperative ... that our Office take the action
needed to protect the Government's interest whenever administra-
tive Disputes Clause decisions are brought to our attention which,
in our opinion, fail to meet the finality standards of the
Wunderlich Act.
2 6
2. Part-Time Boards Lack Record Making Ability. Each full-time board of
contract appeals is required to develop procedures for establishing an ade-
quate appeal record.2 7 Part-time and ad hoc boards have published proce-
dures similar to those of the full-time boards; due to the composition of
these boards, however, there will always be a serious question whether an
agency can fulfill its responsibility of providing a proper disputes procedure,
especially in creating a record that may successfully withstand the test of
judicial review. As stated in the Petrowitz Report:
One thing this study has made clear is that an agency does not nec-
essarily discharge its obligations to contractors by a mere fiat of set-
26. COMP. GEN. B-153841 at 33 (Dec. 5, 1966), 9 G.C. 31. The Department of Defense
disagrees with the general position expressed by the Comptroller General. As stated in a
letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense to Senator Montoya, Chairman, Senate Small
Business Subcommittee on Government Procurement: "The references in the Wunderlich
Act to 'judicial review' and in the Standard Disputes clause to 'a court of competent juris-
diction' do not describe the General Accounting Office. Its authority is the traditional right
under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to take exception to a disbursement deemed
by it to be illegal or fraudulent." 167 FED. CONTRACTS REP. D-3 (May 1, 1967).
The contractor in the "S&E decision" has filed in the Court of Claims for payment of
claims that were upheld by the AEC Board of Contract Appeals. There are a number of
contractors' counsel and Government attorneys who do not agree with the reasoning and
result of the "S&E decision." See Spector, Is It 'Bianchi's Ghost'--Or 'Much Ado About
Nothing'? 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 87, 102 (1964).
27. The Department of Agriculture-Departmental Board of Contract Appeals, 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1-1.28, pt. 10 (1967); The Department of Agriculture-Commodity Credit Corporation
Contract Disputes Board, 7 C.F.R. pt. 1400 (1967); Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals,
32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (1967); Atomic Energy Commission Board of Contract Appeals, 10 C.F.R.
pt. 3 (1967); The Coast Guard Board of Contract Appeals, 41 C.F.R. pt. 11-60 (1967) (dis-
continued); Department of Commerce Appeals Board, 15 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1967); Army Corps of
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals, 33 C.F.R. § 210.4 (1967); Federal Aviation Agency
Contract Appeals Panel, 41 C.F.R. pt. 2-60 (1967); General Services Administration Board of
Contract Appeals, 29 Fed. Reg. 14928 (1965); Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare Board of Review, 30 Fed. Reg. 1847 (1965); Interior Department Board of Contract
Appeals, 43 C.F.R. pt. 4 (1967); National Aeronautics and Space Administration Board of
Contract Appeals, 14 C.F.R. §§ 1209.100 -. 103 (1967); Office of Economic Opportunity
Board of Contract Appeals, 41 C.F.R. pt. 22-60 (1967); Post Office Department Board of
Contract Appeals, 39 C.F.R. pt. 955 (1967); Department of State Contract Appeals Board,
41 C.F.R. pt. 6-60 (1967); Veterans Administration Contract Appeals Board, 38 C.F.R.
§§ 1.770-1.775 (1967); House Office Building Commission Board of Contract Appeals (Rules
available, but not published).
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ting up a board of contract appeals. Court decisions have made it
clear that these boards must adhere to certain minimum proce-
dural standards. Other court decisions clearly indicate that these
standards have not been achieved by all boards, most conspicuously
those that are part-time and ad hoc.28
Generally, a government contractor is interested only in having one full
and fair hearing before an impartial board. In the overwhelming majority
of cases, there is no judicial appeal taken from that initial hearing; it should
therefore be fair, quick, effective, and inexpensive-attributes most often
found in a hearing before a full-time board.
3. Full-Time Boards Provide Incentive to Settle. Using a full-time board of
contract appeals also acts as an incentive for settling disputes arising under
contracts by negotiation with the contracting officer. As pointed out by Louis
Spector, Chairman of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals: "....
the presence of a functioning Board deters tens of thousands of claims
which are, because of the Board, settled at the Contracting Officer's level. '29
Treasury's prior experience under the full-time Coast Guard Board of Con-
tract Appeals and present experience with the GSA Board of Contract Ap-
peals tends to confirm Mr. Spector's analysis, but an account of the dealings
of the Agency for International Development (AID) more dramatically illus-
trates the point.
Operating with an ad hoc board which it found unsatisfactory, AID dis-
solved its board in October 1965 and made arrangements with the Armed
Services Board to handle its disputes.8 0 The AID board had 35 appeals
pending when it was discontinued. Upon transfer to the Armed Services
Board, the number of appeals dropped to six without any action by that
board.3 ' AID is charged an hourly rate by the Department of Defense for
use of the Armed Services Board; the arrangement has worked to the satis-
faction of both agencies.
As Acting General Counsel for the Department of Defense, L.
Niederlehner reported on the deterrent effect of a board of contract appeals
with decision-making authority:
These procedures have proved to be a highly effective incentive
for settlements. Current statistics show that 35 to 40 percent of
cases docketed before the Board are being settled at various stages
of the Board's proceedings. This is, of course, in addition to the
huge number of cases settled at the contracting officer level, because
28. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 149.
29. Address by Louis Spector, Meeting of the A.B.A. Section of Public Contract Law,
National Lawyer's Club, Dec. 6, 1966.
30. 30 Fed. Reg. 13584 (1965).
31. Address by Louis Spector, supra note 29.
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of [sic] the procedures of the Board serve as a deterrent to unneces-
sary appeals.3 2
The evidence indicates that the deterrent effect of a functioning board leads
to the settlement of controversies and not to litigation of disputes.
Since all agencies do not have case loads large enough to warrant estab-
lishing full-time boards of their own, it has been recommended that they take
advantage of existing machinery. The Petrowitz Report states:
If its case-load is 15 or 20 sizable cases a year, however, it may be
preferable for the agency to assign its cases to one of the full-time
boards that can reasonably accomodate the load. The Departments
of Agriculture, Health, Education and Welfare, and State should
consider this course of action. By adopting one of these alternatives,
agencies that have a small case-load can minimize the cost of main-
taining adequate machinery for the administrative handling of con-
tract controversies and still comply with the required procedural
standards.83
In addition to the foregoing advantages, by selecting an existing full-time
board the Treasury Department avoided the need to hire additional per-
sonnel, set aside space for board hearings, create administrative machinery
to handle paper work and dockets, issue regulations and rules for a board,
and establish additional library facilities.
B. Why Use the General Services Administration Board?
Use of the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals was
suggested by the Federal Property Act of 1949. 3 4 The contract disputes pro-
cedure has always been considered part of the procurement function. 35 With
the exception of procurement under the Coinage Act of 1965,80 Treasury's
procurement authority is derived from the Federal Property Act. The Act,
now directly applicable to all executive agencies except those specifically ex-
cluded by other statutes, is implemented by the Federal Procurement Reg-
ulations37 issued by GSA. These regulations are binding on the agencies and,
for purposes of contracting, have the "force and effect of law."'3s
As indicated by the Comptroller General, "One of the primary purposes
of the Federal Property... Act was the establishment of uniform systems and
32. A.B.A. Sec. of Pub. Contract Law, COMMITTEE ON DISPUTES & REMEDIES REP. 1 (Jan.
4, 1967).
33. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 149.
34. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377. as
amended, 79 Stat. 1303 (1965) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 40, 41 U.S.C.).
35. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 1.
36. 79 Stat. 255 (1965), 31 U.S.C. § 393 (Supp. I, 1965).
37. 41 C.F.R. ch. 1 (1967).
38. G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), motion for rehear-
ing denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl., 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964).
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procedures insofar as practicable throughout the various Government agen-
cies .. ."39 The Treasury Department's use of the GSA Board is consistent
with the purpose of the Act of 1949 and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
Contractor appeals from disputes arising under current Treasury contracts
involve the same regulations and clauses from which final decisions are ap-
pealed under GSA contracts. This is quite appropriate, for the Administra-
tor of General Services is authorized
.. : in respect of executive agencies, and to the extent that he deter-
mines that so doing is advantageous to the Government in terms
of economy, efficiency, or service, and with due regard to the pro-
gram activities of the agencies concerned- (1) [to] prescribe policies
and methods of procurement ... including related functions such as
contracting... (3) ... and [to] perform functions related to pro-
curement .... 40
Furthermore, regulations governing rules or standards used by the boards
of all executive agencies, except agencies specifically exempted from the
Federal Procurement Regulations, could be issued by the Adminstrator of
General Services. 41 The existing boards have no statutory basis; they have all
been established and are governed by regulations issued by the agencies.
Using the GSA Board not only gives Treasury the ability to submit dis-
putes to a full-time board, but also aids in achieving greater uniformity in
rules and interpretation of standard contract clauses; decisions are published
and become part of the law of public contracts.
C. Why Not Have All Agencies Except Those Exempted from Federal
Procurement Regulations Use the General Services Administration Board?
Since GSA is authorized to prescribe procurement policies and procedures
for executive agencies, 42 it is practicable, although unlikely, for all agen-
cies required to use Federal Procurement Regulations to refer their dis-
putes to the GSA Board. It has been suggested that GSA could at least provide
guidance through the Federal Procurement Regulations.4 3 Although the
foundation of the disputes procedure is the agreement of the parties to the
contract, the adoption of regulations and standards would achieve greater
uniformity and should not be inhibited.
Such authorities as Prof. Arthur S. Miller and Dean Ralph Nash of
George Washington University Law School have suggested that the GSA
39. 39 Comp. Gen. 426, 428 (1959).
40. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 § 201 (a), 63 Stat. 383, 40
U.S.C. § 481 (a) (1964).
41. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.001 to -1.005 (1967).
42. Ibid.
43. Hiestand & Parler, The Disputes Procedure Under Government Contracts: The Role
of the Appeals Boards and the Courts, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1, 25 (1966).
1967]
Catholic University Law Review
board should handle all non-military contract disputes appeals. In a confer-
ence 44 preliminary to the hearings leading to the Petrowitz Report,4 5 these
comments were made:
Mr. NASH. [I]f you have got a situation where you have, let's say,
a half dozen smaller agencies that have two cases a year, that prob-
ably is the simplest of all to solve. Throw those cases into some
other board that has the volume to support full-time members.
Mr. MILLER. Throw them all into GSA.
Mr. PEROWITZ. As you know, there is a trend in this direction.
* * .
Mr. NASH. If we want to focus on some way to improve or some
way to get.., appeals into a judicial or administrative procedure
that is more judicialized in our terms, that, it seems to me, is some-
thing that might be worth doing, and is a useful first step. For ex-
ample, I think consideration ought to be given to having a single
board of contract appeals, probably under the General Services Ad-
ministration, since they have a lot of authority in this area, that
would handle appeals from all the civilian agencies.
Mr. PETROWITZ. I recommended that 3 years ago.
Mr. Nash. Or at least say an agency could avail itself of this board
if they did not have the volume to set up a full-time board.
Mr. FAIRBANKS. Why separate civilian and military, Ralph?
Mr. NASH. Only because I think we have got a pretty good ma-
chine working in the military, and I do not see any point in dis-
mantling the machinery.46
Since GSA board rules are in substantial compliance with those of the
Armed Services Board, such a step would achieve the long-sought uniformity
of procedure.
D. Can a Departmental Secretary Lawfully Delegate Authority to a Board
in Another Agency?
While Treasury was considering referring its disputes to an extra-depart-
mental board, the question arose, could the Secretary lawfully delegate such
authority? Since the boards have their legal basis only in the contract dis-
putes clause and in the agency's authority to contract, this did not pose a
problem. The parties to the contract agree to be bound by the decision of a
duly authorized representative or board chosen by the Secretary, provided
the decision is supported by substantial evidence. The contractor is not
bound on a question of law. 47 "The Supreme Court makes it very clear in the
44. Hearings Before a Senate Subcomm. of the Select Comm. on Small Business on Boards
of Contracts Appeals, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 5, at 147.
45. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13.
46. Hearings Before a Senate Subcomm. of the Select Comm. on Small Business on Boards
of Contracts Appeals, supra note 44, at 153, 167.
47. Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
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Utah decision that the parties are free to contractually agree to give the ap-
peals boards mandatory jurisdiction over all classes of appeals."48 The Secre-
tary is not limited by statute4 9 or by the disputes clause5 0 as to whom he des-
ignates as a representative or board; he is not directed to limit his selection
to employees of the department.
The question on the delegation of authority was raised in the hearings
preliminary to the Petrowitz Report:
Senator MONTOYA. Now, the Armed Services Board has been del-
egated the authority to hear cases arising in agencies outside of the
Department of Defense, in other words, the Agency for International
Development, the U.S. Information Agency, Central Intelligence
Agency, and the National Science Foundation.
In view of the opposition that the Comptroller General has ex-
pressed to the arbitration of cases directly involving the Govern-
ment, do you think that this delegation is legal in the absence of a
statute?
Mr. SPECTOR. I see no resemblance between this and the GAO's
displeasure with arbitration, sir.
Every Government contract contains a disputes article which pro-
vides for an appeal to the head of the department or his duly au-
thorized representative or board. We are, under our charter, the
duly authorized representative of the Secretaries of Defense, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
Now, if the Administrator for the Agency for International De-
velopment feels that he does not have sufficient cases to warrant
constituting a board of his own, and wishes to designate this Board
as the board referred to in his contracts, I think that is in perfect
keeping with the terms of the contract and its disputes article. It is
just exactly the same as when the Secretary of Defense designates
the Board to implement the disputes article in Defense Depart-
ment contracts. 51
Paul H. Gantt, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Board of Con-
tract Appeals stated before the same committee: "If a department or agency
does not have a sufficient volume of appeals which would warrant a separate
and independent full-time board, then such agency should have their dis-
putes and appeals adjudicated by another appeal board."5 2 Since the Armed
Services Board is caring for several outside agencies, Treasury's move is not
without precedent. 53
48. Nash, The Disputes Procedure, I No.3 A.B.A. PUB. CONTRACT NEWSLETTER 6 (1966).
49. Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
50. 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-12 (1967). See supra note 3, for general discussion of disputes
clause.
51. Hearings Before a Senate Subcomm. of the Select Comm. on Small Business on Boards
of Contracts Appeals, supra note 44, at 30.
52. Id. at 61.
53. The General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals also has decided
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Nor is reimbursement a problem. Treasury, in effect, has contracted with
GSA to render a service on a reimbursable basis.
Any executive Department ... if funds are available therefor and if
... in the interest of the Government so to do, may place orders
with any other such department, establishment ... for... services,
of any kind that such requisitioned Federal agency may be in a
position to supply or equipped to render.. .. 54
E. Why Use Trial Counsel to Represent the Department?
To represent the department before the board, Treasury decided to use
trial counsel from its Office of General Counsel who were previously uncon-
nected with the dispute, a practice with much to recommend it. Some agen-
cies use a trial attorney from the same office where the dispute originated.
This means that he probably participated in negotiations before the con-
tract award, drafted the contract, interpreted clauses during contract ad-
ministration, advised the contracting officer and technical personnel during
periods of contract delay and failure to meet specifications, and prepared
memoranda supporting the final decision of the contracting officer.
Such involvement is generally not conducive to the effective handling of
the appeal before the board. An impartial trial counsel should be brought
in at the appeal stage because a fresh approach would, among other things,
facilitate the possibility of a negotiated settlement. 55 Moreover, governmental
establishments at various levels, such as the Department of Justice, the Office
of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the Office of
the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia have established appel-
late divisions to handle appealed cases on the theory that attorneys in such
divisions can give to the printed record on appeal that objective approach
which the appellate body must give to the record.
III. Board Trends and Forecasts
Treasury is not the only department or agency that has taken a step toward
board consolidation. A trend toward a further reduction in the number of
boards is in the making and has been reported as follows:
A development in contract appeals board reorganization in re-
cent years that has scarcely been of large enough proportion to call
cases occasionally for some independent agencies. Another board, that of the Atomic Energy
Commission, even includes employees of other agencies and nongovernment employees in
its membership.
54. 31 U.S.C. § 686(a) (1964). The original language can be found in 41 Stat. 613 (1920).
The question of reimbursing another agency for this type of service was checked informally
by the author with a top legal official at General Accounting Office, who indicated that, in
his opinion, GAO probably would not object, and that the proper authority for such an
intragovernment procurement is 31 U.S.C. § 686 (1964).
55. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 124, 154.
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a trend-the shut-down of contract appeals board machinery in cer-
tain agencies with very small caseloads and the transfer of that
function to large, well-established boards in other agencies-is sud-
denly accelerating very rapidly.
At least three such moves are now in the offing. These involve the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Treasury De-
partment; and the State Department.56
The State Department has decided to use the Armed Services Board; regu-
lations are scheduled for publication in the Federal Register sometime in
the fall of 1967.
Rules establishing the Transportation Department Contract Appeals
Board were published in May 1967. 57 This board will hear appeals formerly
heard by the Federal Aviation Agency Contracts Appeals Panel, the Coast
Guard Board of Contract Appeals, and appeals from the Bureau of Public
Roads which were formerly handled by the Department of Commerce Ap-
peals Board. The new board is full-time; all members are lawyers. Although
Transportation has established a separate board, within the next few years it is
entirely possible that government reorganization, changes in procurement
regulations, and fluctuations in requirements may leave only the Armed
Services and General Services Administration boards, the two now handling
approximately 90 percent of the appeals.58
Proposed legislation might head in this direction. Rep. Chet Holifield
(D-Calif.) has introduced a bill to establish a Commission on Government
Procurement. 5 The commission would study and assess the entire govern-
ment procurement process. Most certainly, a significant commission study
area would be contract appeals board operations. In endorsing the proposed
commission, the Comptroller General suggested fifteen specific subjects for
consideration, including two affecting the boards.60 One subject related to
the questions: (1) Is there a need for greater uniformity in procedures and
decisions of contract appeal boards? (2) If there is such a need, would the
establishment of one or two government-wide appeal boards satisfy such a
need?
If the commission is established, any other proposals of a statutory nature6'
56. FED. CONTRAcTS REP., supra note 26, at A-1.
57. 41 C.F.R. pt. 12-60 (1967).
58. Hearings Before a Senate Subcomm. of the Select Comm. on Small Business on Boards
of Contracts Appeals, supra note 44, at 147. In number, dollar amount and complexity, how-
ever, the Armed Services Board handles by far the greater proportion of this percentage.
59. H.R. No. 12510, formerly No. 157, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); S. No. 1145, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967). When Senator Jackson introduced the Senate bill, he stated: "The goal to be
sought is a unified approach to procurement problems." 160 FED. CONTRACt REP. A-20 (March
13, 1967).
60. 160 FED. CONTRAar REP. A-18 (March 13, 1967); Communique No. 67-3 (May 1, 1967).
61. Creyke, Is a Code of Federal Contracts Claims Procedure Needed? 1 A.B.A. PUB. CON-
TRACt, L.J. 2 (1967).
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or comprehensive legislation 62 involving the boards probably would be held
in abeyance pending a report by the commission. Practically speaking, this
could mean a minimum delay of four to six years for the study, report is-
suance, hearings and, if recommended, legislation. But there is no need to
wait that long in order to mollify board critics and raise the stature of the
boards, all within the framework of existing law and regulations.
In the past, serious charges regarding the composition, procedures, and
jurisdiction of the boards have often been raised. Gilbert A. Cuneo com-
piled and summarized the complaints as follows:
... the substantial lack of subpoena power in Boards, unavailability
of the use of discovery and deposition, lack of a complete authority
in BCAs to decide breach of contract cases resulting in fractionaliza-
tion of contractual remedies, lack of any form of tenure for Board
members, confusion with regard to the finality of BCA decisions,
abscence of authority in Board members to administer oaths, ina-
bility of part-time and ad hoc Board members to give sufficient time
to performance of Board responsibilities, lack of separation of
power in certain situations whereby a BCA is part of General Coun-
sel's office or where Board members serve as a part-time or ad hoc
basis.63
When the present posture of the boards is analyzed, however, it would ap-
pear that all of these complaints, except for the lack of subpoena power, can
be corrected within the framework of existing law. Many of them are now
in the process of being corrected or have been corrected.
Today nearly all disputes are heard and decided by a full-time board in
a fair and expeditious hearing. In fact, Kenneth Culp Davis, who advocates
that the Administrative Procedure Act does and should apply to boards of
contract appeals,64 says, "The truth is that the Armed Services Board and
the General Services Administration Board are already in substantial com-
pliance with the APA." 65 Even more recently, F. Trowbridge vom Baur
wrote:
62. Cuneo & Anthony, Beyond Bianchi: The Impact of Utah and Grace on Judicial Review
of Contract Appeals Boards' Decisions, 55 GEO. L.J. 602, 603 (1967).
63. Cuneo, supra note 11, at 36.
64. Davis, The Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Boards of Contract Appeals, I
A.B.A. Pun. CONTRACT L.J. 4 (1967). It appears, however, that any attempt to remove the
present exemption for public contracts from the Administrative Procedure Act is imprac-
ticable. Frank M. Wozencraft, Assistant Attorney General, testifying before the Subcom-
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
May 3, 1967, stated:
I have discussed this question with Chief Judge Wilson Cowan of the Court of Claims
as well as with counsel for the major procurement agencies. All of them agree with your
consultants, Professor Nathanson of Northwestern Law School and Professor McFarland
of Virginia Law School, that it is much more appropriate to make procedural improve-
ments in this highly specialized field by amendment of Title 41.
65. Davis, supra note 64, at 10. See Leventhal, supra note 14, at 39.
[Vol. XVII
Too Many Boards of Contract Appeals?
... the major boards of contract appeals, staffed with capable men
and acting with true judicial impartiality, have now developed
over 25 years of workmanlike decisions which, on the whole, have
been written with reassuring care, and which compare favorably
with the decisions of the federal courts. These decisions now exert
a wide influence.66
Furthermore, Louis Spector, chairman of the Armed Services Board, has
initiated contact among the various board chairmen to bring about greater
uniformity in procedures. A meeting of all chairmen was held on February
23, 1967, at which it was agreed that a continuing series of meetings would
be instituted for the purpose of developing a model set of rules.6 7 A number
of meetings have been held already.
Although only two boards now have statutory authority to issue subpoenas,
the chairman of one of them considers this power unimportant: "We have
not as yet utilized this power. Although requests have been made for the
issuance of subpoenas, it has been the board's experience that no subpoena
was really necessary and that such matters could be handled by agreement
of the parties." 6s This commendable attitude is shared by almost all board
chairmen.
The fragmentation of claims problem should be diminished soon.
"The Armed Services Procurement Regulations Committee has submitted
for industry consideration a form of all 'breaches clause' covering 'Interfer-
ence with Performance.' "69 If adopted, the clause would tend to retain at
board level those few breach-of-contract claims that now go to the Court of
Claims or district courts. As for the rest of the complaints, all full-time
boards, which handle substantially all of the appeals, have been separated
from agency general counsel offices; 70 lawyers and non-lawyers appointed to
boards must comply with Civil Service requirements in their respective
fields; 71 and for all practical purposes board decisions are final.72 Rarely, if
ever, has an agency head overruled or influenced a board decision. 73 This
66. vom Baur, Remedies of Contractors with the Government, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469,
495 (1967).
67. FED. CONTRAcrs REP., supra note 26, at D-1.
68. Gantt, The Atomic Energy Commission Board of Contract Appeals, 4 THE FORUM
No. 7, 13 (1966). On a very few occasions, however, agency heads have invoked 5 U.S.C. §
304 (Supp. II, 1966) to subpoena witnesses.
69. 189 FED. CONTRACTS REP. A-14 (Aug. 21, 1967), 9 G.C. 305.
70. Petrowitz Report, supra note 13, at 35-121.
71. FED. CONTRACTS REP., supra note 67, at S-1. In view of the judicial nature of a board
hearing, the fact that not all of the full-time board members are lawyers is one of the major
problems that still needs to be corrected.
72. Spector, Is It 'Bianchi's Ghost'-Or 'Much Ado About Nothing'? 29 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 87, 102 (1964).
73. Sass, A Government Lawyer Looks at the Contract Appeal System, 8 CATHOLIC U. L.
REv. 23, 24 (1959).
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is also true of the General Accounting Office, which has occasionally sought
to overrule a board decision.74
Not everyone is satisfied with the present board system nor would every-
one be satisfied regardless of how it were changed. But before too much
momentum develops into a demand for legislative changes, these words
should be pondered: ".... there is an essentially greater procedural flexibility,
informality (and informality is sometimes a virtue), and responsiveness to
public need in a process which is contractual, rather than statutory, in ori-
gin." 75 The changes in the contract disputes procedure during the last seven
years augurs well for the wisdom of that statement. Hopefully, it will still be
true during the next seven years.
74. S&E decision, supra note 26, at 35.
75. Spector, Anatomy of a Dispute, 20 FED. B.J. 398, 400 n.10 (1960).
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